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Chapter 2
Foreign Exchange Regimes,
1946-1961: Oscillations
between Phases I, II, and V
The years between the end of World War II and the nationalizations of 1961
form a convenient period for the start of our survey. During its entirety Egypt
continued to rely mainly upon private enterprise and, until the last year or
two, applied only policy measures that were consistent with it and that had
been used in Europe until the trade liberalization of the mid-fifties. The period
started with the country leaving the sterling area and saw the introduction
and termination of a number of exchange control arrangements, as well as a
strong expansion of bilateral trade.1 After the Suez War of 1956, trade with
communist countries rose sharply and a substantial effective depreciation of
the currency took place, leading up to the official devaluation of 1962.
The beginning of the period under review was characterized by the post-
war recovery, and until 1947 a number of wartime restrictions disappeared.
Thus, it may be said that the immediate postwar years somewhat resembled
the co-directors' Phase V (see p. 349), although strongly influenced by the
special postwar conditions.
Despite a huge exchange reserve, the improving cotton price, and a con-
tinued economic upswing, from 1947 onward Egypt ran into serious exchange
problems, closely related to the difficulties of the British economy and the
pound sterling. A number of foreign exchange measures were taken, and dur-
ing the years 1947 to 1950 the country clearly found itself in Phase I on the
road to balance of payments and exchange controls. (See pp. 26—32 below.)
During the Korean boom, 1950—1952, the country experienced a brief
spell of import liberalization—not unlike Phase V—but also an integrated
portion of anti-inflationary policies. (See the discussion on pp. 32—39 below.)
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With the breakdown of the Korean boom, exchange controls were tight-
ened again, and, since various arrangements introduced during the years 1947—
1950 (Phase I) were never abrogated, it sense to identify the period
from 1953 to 1961 as Phase II. Although the nature of the controls varied
quite substantially during these years, they generally tended to become ever
tighter.
The changed institutional framework in the wake of the nationalization
of foreign trade in 1961 makes it difficult to identify further developments in
terms of the phases set up by the co-directors.
THE POSTWAR RECOVERY
Egypt came out of World War 11—during which, although theoretically neu-
tral, the country served as the main Middle East base for the Allied forces—
without much direct destruction. The productive machinery was worn out,
however, and agriculture suffered from soil exhaustion due to insufficient
fertilizing during the war years. Stocks of imported raw materials and con-
sumer goods, including food, were emptied. On the other hand, the country
had accumulated substantial stocks of cotton and a very large foreign ex-
change reserve, held in pounds sterling in London. This reserve
to more than two-thirds of Egypt's national income, or about four years' im-
ports at the 1945 level.
Under these circumstances, there could be only one course to
to use exchange reserves for replacement and modernization in industry and
communications, replenishment of exhausted commodity stocks, and recovery
of soil fertility. The policy was successful in terms of production, which in-
creased rapidly in industry and agriculture. Large trade deficits did appear
(although improvements in the terms of trade favored the country greatly),
but foreign exchange reserves declined slowly as British military spending
continued, Suez Canal toll revenues increased, and exchange controls con-
tained the pressure on the balance of payments. The major developments are
shown in Tables 2—1 and 2—2, as well as in Table 1—3.
THE DOLLAR SHORTAGE, TRIANGULAR
TRANSACTIONS, AND THE EXPORT POUND:
PHASE I
The exchange control regime in Egypt originated at the outbreak of World
War II. At that time Britain imposed exchange controls on her foreign trans-
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TABLE 2-2
Trade with Sterling Area and Nonsterling
Countries, 1946—1950
(mill. LE)
Merchandise
Exports
Sterling Non-
Merchandise
Imports
Sterling Non-
Balance on
Current Account
Sterling Non-
Year Area sterling Area sterling Area sterling
1946 24.4 27.5 39.0 49.6 +8.4 —27.8
1947 31.4 35.8 37.1 63.3 +12.2 —43.9
1948 67.0 65.6 68.9 93.6 +29.5 —41.7
1949 64.7 74.0 57.8 100.5 +33.2 —38.9
1950 73.0 111.9 84.7 132.0 +8.1 —22.5
SOURCE: Economic Bulletin, National Bank of Egypt, various issues.
actions, a move which was followed by similar measures in Egypt and other
countries belonging to the sterling area. While trade and capital movements
within the sterling area were unrestricted, transactions in currencies other
than sterling were tightly controlled. Egypt, as a member, desposited all of her
foreign exchange earnings in the London pool, where they were credited to
her in sterling, while, in turn, Britain would annually release foreign curren-
cies to Egypt according to a quota system instituted for her trading partners.
Even then, the composition and origin of Egyptian imports were controlled
from the Allied Center for the Supply of the Middle East.
It was only in December 1944 that Egypt regained her freedom to import
and the administration of exchange control was shifted from London to the
Foreign Exchange Control Committee at Cairo, an Egyptian government au-
thority. In practice, however, Egypt was limited by the inconvertibility of her
sterling balances, the restrictions (through the quotas mentioned above) im-
posed on her access to hard currencies, and the commodity shortages in the
sterling area.
The sterling balances stemmed mainly from the expenditures by the Al-
lied forces in Egypt and the inability of the Allies to meet Egypt's import
requirements. The reserves, on a steady uptrend during the war, reached their
peak immediately afterwards at £E425 million. The Egyptian government
found it both natural and desirable that in this situation it should be able to
utilize its sterling balances to finance a dollar trade deficit for a number of
years. Hence, an Egyptian delegation was sent to London in June 1947
to negotiate along these lines on the disposal of the sterling balances. The
agreement that emerged, however, was to fall significantly short of Egyptian
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plans and hopes. The British position on all such sterling balances accumu-
lated during the war years was that (1) a part of the balances would be re-
leased and made freely convertible immediately; (2) another part would be
gradually released over a period of years; and (3) the remainder would
be "readjusted" or "scaled down."2 It meant, simply, that her colonies and
dependencies were expected to pay part of the costs of World War II. In
Egypt's case, the part released as "No. 1 sterling account" was £8 million,
with an additional £12 million put on standby to meet any deficit; the re-
mainder was blocked as "No. 2 sterling account."
Faced with these terms, Egypt decided to leave the sterling area, although
the British threats of "scaling down" the balances never materialized. An
additional consideration in this decision was that Britain was still unable at
that time to deliver the raw materials and capital equipment that Egypt badly
needed. Wheat, in particular, which Egypt needed to import on a large scale,
was not available for export in the sterling area. Thus, sterling as such was
not very useful. Egypt's imports form nonsterling countries exceeded those
from the sterling area, resulting in a substantial current hard currency deficit.
At the same time, on top of her accumulated sterling balances, her current
sterling account was also in surplus (mostly because of continued British mili-
tary expenditures in Egypt and increasing Suez Canal revenues).
It should be recalled that Britain was committed to the United States (as
a condition for loans obtained in 1946) to introduce full convertibility of the
pound sterling. Egypt thus had good reason to expect that whatever was re-
leased from her blocked balances would be fully convertible into hard cur-
rency. As of July 15, 1947, the British actually did introduce full converti-
bility, and the Egyptian exchange position then looked fairly satisfactory. This
situation did not last long, however, and the problem of her deficit vis-à-vis
non-sterling area countries was again accentuated when Britain, on August
20, 1947, reneged on its commitment to full convertibility.3 Egypt found her-
self placed outside the sterling area, with all her reserves in sterling and partly
blocked, and with no right to convertibility of released balances and of current
sterling earnings. The subsequent transfer of £21 million from No. 2 to No. 1
account under a 1948 agreement had no effect in alleviating the shortage of
nonsterling currencies, nor any relevance to her sterling trade, where Egypt
was running a surplus in any case. At the same time, Egypt's efforts to increase
her exports to dollar countries were frustrated as the United States imposed
import restrictions on cotton.4
This situation resulted in two Egyptian policy moves: (1) relaxation and
subsequent removal in March 1948 of trade regulations against sterling area
countries and any other country accepting sterling; and (2) adoption of auxili-
ary trade methods to alleviate the dollar shortage.
.x
30 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
Triangular Trade.
One such auxiliary method was to engage in triangular trade relations
with other sterling area countries which, instead of selling their dollar earnings
to the London pool, would manage to buy dollar goods and resell them against
sterling at prices higher than those corresponding to the official parity. Through
these arrangements Egypt was able to convert part of her transferable sterling
into dollar goods, although at a premium. The premium was in the range of
20 to 25 percent, as quotations for most third countries' transferable sterling
accounts were in the range of U.S. $2.95—3.10 per Egyptian pound, compared
with a par rate of U.S. $4.027 per Egyptian pound.
Conversely, Egyptian cotton bought with sterling was offered against
hard currencies "at a considerable discount," thus making direct purchases
from Egypt by hard currency countries unprofitable. Hence the government
resorted to direct cotton sales against hard currencies from its surplus stocks
(accumulated during the war) at low prices. It also reserved certain export
goods, such as rice and cottonseed cake, for hard currency purchasers.5 These
transactions clearly represented a partial depreciation of the Egyptian pound
vjs-à-vis the U.S. dollar and other hard currencies.
Barter Trade and Bilateral Agreements.
Other auxiliary trade methods adopted at the same time were barter and
bilateral agreements with countries facing similar problems. The first such
barter agreement was concluded with the Soviet Union in 1948, shortly fol-
lowed by a bilateral agreement with France. Bilateral trade was increasingly
resorted to throughout the 19 SOs in coping with balance of payments difficul-
ties (see p. 43 below).
Licensing.
A licensing system for exports to and imports from countries outside the
sterling area was also introduced in 1948. Export products were divided into
four schedules which differed as to means of payment and restrictions on the
volume exported. For instance, shoes and hides could only be exported against
hard currency, while yarn and textiles could only be exported after domestic
demand was fulfilled. Most imports were licensed as to country of origin;
licenses were given freely to imports from countries with which Egypt had
bilateral agreements, while tight restrictions were imposed on imports from
the dollar area. With imports thus restricted, the government moved to limit
excess profits through price control, specifying maximum profit margins ac-
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cording to the type of goods involved (for example, woolens, 30 percent,
agricultural machinery, 22 percent, tea and coffee, 18 percent).6 There is no
evidence that significant shortages developed in these commodities. By and
large, it seems that quantities sufficient to clear the market at the controlled
prices were imported; this, of course, indicates that prices and profit margins
must have been set at generous levels.
The Export Pound.
In March 1949 a new agreement was reached with Britain, converting
£ E5 million into dollars and shifting £ El 2 million from the No. 2 to the
No. 1 (released sterling) account. As the Egyptian No. 1 sterling balances
at that time stood at £ E7.4 million, the new releases were of little immediate
consequence. Indeed, the problem continued to be inability to deliver
commodities at competitive prices. Moreover, a critical restrictive amendment
was attached to the agreement: Britain insisted that the right to use sterling
be restricted to direct current transactions on goods originating in the country
to which the payment was made.7 By thus barring triangular transactions,
it deprived Egypt of an important access to hard currency goods. In response,
Egypt created a transferable Egyptian pound on "export account" to finance
trade with soft currency countries.
As a background to a discussion of the export pound arrangement, a few
words are in order on the international devaluations that took place in Sep-
tember 1949. Britain devalued against the U.S. dollar by over 30 percent, and
Egypt, which sent roughly half of her exports to sterling area countries, fol-
lowed suit immediately. Since Egypt's trade with the United States was very
small at that time, the average depreciation involved was very small as well.
The result was some rise in cotton prices in Egypt and a reorientation of cot-
ton exports toward hard currency countries, while expectations of price in-
creases in Britain as a consequence of the sterling devaluation induced a
temporary increase of imports from the sterling area. Egyptian sterling bal-
ances fell steadily as exports to the United Kingdom were reduced. The devel-
opment of a deficit in sterling and the subsequent reduction of free Egyptian
sterling balances prompted the government from 1952 on to follow a path
of increasing general intervention in foreign trade (see pp. 41—45).
We mentioned that Egypt created so-called "export accounts" so that
Egyptian pounds could be used in trade with soft currency countries in lieu
of the abolished triangular transactions in pounds sterling. Under this arrange-
ment Egyptian importers of specified hard currency goods from specified soft
currency countries could make their Egyptian pound payment to nonresidents'
"export accounts." Egyptian pounds from these accounts were freely trans-
ferable to other nonresidents and could be used to pay for Egyptian exports
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to a long list of soft currency countries. The "export pounds," being freely
transferable, were traded and quoted at a discount in third-country exchange
markets. In this way Egypt could acquire hard currency goods indirectly
through third countries, while exports from Egypt to such countries were
promoted.
The whole arrangement amounted, of course, to a partial, floating ex-
change rate for Egyptian pounds and involved a depreciation of the currency.
While the official rate set in September 1949 was U.S. $2.87 per Egyptian
pound, the price in Tangiers of Egyptian pounds on export account ranged
between U.S. $2.24 and $2.48 during 1951, with a tendency to increase over
the next several years (Table 2—3, col. 2). Thus, the depreciation of the export
pound averaged about 17 percent in 1950, but only about 9 percent from
1953 to 1955. The rates depended mostly on the quantities of wheat Egypt
was buying abroad with export pounds.
The depreciation was partial since it affected only a small part of total
trade: at its peak in 1953 the export pound covered only 14 percent of exports
and 12 percent of imports. Therefore, the average depreciation accomplished
by this means was small, ranging from 1.17 to 0.18 percent over the period
1950—1955 (Table 2—4). Since export pounds were also. bought to pay for
exports to dollar areas—resulting in reduced dollar receipts—the government
found it appropriate to replace the export pound gradually by an import
entitlement system, and to expand bilateral trade.
THE KOREAN BOOM AND IMPORT
LIBERALIZATION IN EGYPT: PHASE V
The Korean War, responsible for a strong increase in cotton prices (by about
130 percent from 1949 to 1951, calculated on annual averages) and, hence,
an improvement in the barter terms of trade (by about 75 percent, as shown
in Table 2—5), helped to create a kind of "stag-flation" in the Egyptian econ-
omy. The boom was accompanied by some domestic price increases (see Table
2—6); the cost of living rose by about 7 percent annually from 1949 to 1951.
Production was rather stagnant during this period. Agricultural output
fell by 8 percent, while industrial production rose by only 4 percent. Real
GNP increased by less than 5 percent from 1949 to 1951 (Table 2—7). But
the strong improvement of the terms of trade brought a rise in real national
income (GNI) of 8 percent in 1950 and another 7 percent in 1951. Although
the accompanying uptrend in demand certainly influenced domestic prices, it
found a partial outlet in increased imports, which, despite a rise of about 50
percent in. export value, caused both the balance of trade and the balance of
current payments to deteriorate during the boom.
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TABLE 2-4
Depreciation through the Export Pound
(percent)
Export Pound,
Depreciation
in Relation to
Par Rate
Proportion of Total
Trade Effectuated
via Export Account
Average Depreciation
for Total Trade
through Export Pound
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1950 17 5 2 0.85 0.34
1951 13 10 9 1.30 1.17
1952 12 7 5 0.84 0.60
1953 9 14 12 1.26 1.08
1954 7 6 5 0.42 0.35
1955 9 3 1 - 0.27 0.09
SouRcEs: Col. (1): Averages of Table 2—3, col. (2).
Cols. (2) and (3): Calculated on basis of figures for payments on export account
from Economic Bulletin, National Bank of Egypt, 1953 and 1959, and for total export
and import from Hansen and Marzouk, op. cit., pp. 186—187.
TABLE 2-5
Cotton Prices, Terms of Trade,
and Foreign Trade, 1949—1953
Cotton
Price for
Crop of
Previous
Year,
Barter
Terms of
Trade
(1938—39 % of GNP
Value
(mill. LE)
Balance on
Balance Current
LE/Kantar 100) Exports Imports of Trade Account
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1949 11.05 137 15.8 19.1 —18 —4
1950 14.93 176 18.2 20.8 —32 —14
1951 25.14 243 19.4 22.1 —39 —15
1952 18.24 155 15.5 23.0 —64 —53
1953 12.28 118 15.3 19.2 —29 —8
SouRcEs: Cot. (1): Annuaire Slatistique, Cairo, 1960—1961. The prices are averages
for cotton season (Sept. 1—Aug. 31) for all varieties.
Cal. (2): Hansen and Marzouk, op. cit., p. 176.
Cols. (3)—(6): Thid., p. 174 and Table 1. III.
I
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TABLE 2-6
Prices and Wages
Industrial Wages:
Wholesale Prices Cost of Living Weekly Earnings
(1953= 100) (1953= 100) (SE)
Year (1) (2) (3)
1949 88 94 1.46
1950 97 99 1.69
1951 108 108 1.94
1952 105 107 1.90
1953 100 100 2.03
SouRcE: D. Mead, Growth and Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy, Home-
wood, III., 1967, Tables VI—F—l and IJ—B—7.
TABLE 2-7
National Income and Production, 1949—1953
Growth Real Gross
Rate National Growth
Real GNP, of Incomea Rate
at 1954 Real at 1954 of Real Agricultural Industrial
Prices GNP Prices GNI Production Production
(mill. LE) (%) (mill. LE) (%) (1949= 100) (1949= 100)
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1949 927 5.7 937 3.2 100 100
1950 945 1.9 1,013 8.1 95 105
1951 971 2.8 1,084 7.0 92 104
1952 992 2.2 1,001 —7.7 102 107
1953 981 —1.1 956 —4.5 94 108
SouRcEs: Cols. (1) to (4): Hansen and Marzouk, op. cit., p. 319.
Col. (5): See Table 2—I, col. (1).
Col. (6): See Table 2—I, col. (2).
a. Includes terms of trade gains.
A more detailed analysis of events is, unfortunately, handicapped by the
existence of two different series of government budget figures: the official
series (see Table 2—8, A) and a revised series compiled by the Institute of
National Planning, Cairo (Table 2—8, B). The latter is based on United Na-
tions definitions and classification and is known to be a thorough and compe-
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TABLE 2-8
Egypt's Budget
Budget
Year
July 1 to
A. Government Budget: Official Presentation
Expenditure
"Economic Revenue
Surplus Total Administration" Total Customs Duties
June30 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1948—49 —15 158 34 143 53
1949—50 —15 164 36 159 62
1950—51 2 190 38 185 75
1951—52 —39 233 n.a. 194 77
1952—53 —10 208 n.a. - 198 74
B. Government Ordinary Budget: Special Study
Budget
Year
July 1 to
Expenditure Revenue
"Economic Duties on
Surplus Total Services" Total Imports Exports Total
June30 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1948—49 —2 145 34 143 46 10 56
1949—50 —28 187 75 159 50 11 61
1950—51 46 204 72 250 80 24 104
1951—52 —25 219 54 194 60 14 74
1952—53 —4 202 43 198 57 14 71
SOURCES: A: Annuaire Stazistique, 1949—1950, 1950—1951, Cairo, 1953; 1951—1952,
1952—1953, and 1953—1954, Cairo, 1956.
B: Mead, op. cit., Tables VI—E—3 and VI—E—4. These figures are based on an
unpublished study by Rasheed Khalid of the IMF at the Institute of National Planning,
Cairo. Khalid's reclassification and presentation follows the principles laid down in A
Manual for the Economic and Functional Classification of Government Transactions,
United Nations, 1958.
tent piece of work. It also makes more sense than the official budget series
insofar as it shows strong uptrends in government spending for 1949—50,
when the government embarked upon a development program, and in cus-
toms revenues for 1950—51, when foreign trade reached its peak—two phe-
nomena neither one of which shows up in the official series. On the other
hand, it is difficult to reconcile the revised series' large surplus figure. for
1950—51 with data on changes in the banking system's net claims on the gov-;
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eminent (see Table 3—5). Considering the known government loan trans-
actions outside the banking system, in particular the large Palestinian War
Loan of £E30 million in 1948—49, the official surplus figures tally reasonably
well with the changes in the banking system's net claims on the government.
The revised surplus figures do too, except for 1950—51. We suspect that—
being based on U.N. definitions—the revised revenue figures reflect tax liabili-
ties rather than actual tax collections; it stands to reason that large tax arrears
were built up during the boom years (a very normal phenomenon in Egypt)
which, after the collapse of the boom in 1952 and the land reforms and other
events that followed, were never paid. These considerations have led us to use
the revised figures for all years except 1950-5 1, for which we have preferred
to use the official revenue figures. But we call the reader's attention to the fact
that the analysis of 1950—5 1 depends critically upon which budget revenue
figures are used; since both sets of figures may be correct (in terms of their
own definition) our problem is, in effect, whether budget analysis should be
based on actual tax receipts or on tax liabilities; Our choice is to work on a
cash basis.
Inflationary tendencies were already beginning to build up in the econ-
omy before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The development
program implied an increase of government expenditure in 1949—50 by about
£E40 million, corresponding to 4 percent of the national income, and a
budget deficit of close to £E30 million (Table 2—8, B). At first, the main
impact of the expansionary forces was on imports rather than on prices and
domestic production. Imports started to increase as a result of a reduction in
tariff rates accompanying the removal of trade regulations with the sterling
area (see below), the increasing export capacity of the member countries of
the area, and some shift from grain crops to cotton in Egypt.
From the second half of 1950, exports took the lead in the expansionary
process. The major driving force was certainly the rising world demand for
raw materials of strategic importance. Both export and import values soared,
exports through price increases, imports mainly through volume increases.
The expansion of the value of imports in 1950 was stronger than the value
of exports, which by itself suggests that domestic forces added to the export
boom. The money supply began to increase—by 4.2 percent in 1950 and 6.5
percent in 1951, as compared with a slight fall in 1949 (see Table 3—5).
Even so, money supply was hardly a decisive factor in the process.8 More
importantly, government expenditures expanded further during 1950-51 and
• 195 1—52. On the other hand, production tended to stagnate during 1950
and 1951, partly because crops were small (due to low floods and plant dis-
ease), but also because industrial expansion slowed down. Government reve-
nue in 1950-5 1 (even according to the official figures) rose so much that the
deficits of the earlier years were replaced by a small surplus, serving to dampen
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domestic demand somewhat. The revenue increase was, however, mainly an
automatic response to the expansionary forces emanating from both exports
and government expenditure; in 195 1—52 the growth in expenditure actually
exceeded that in revenue, and a substantial deficit developed once again.
The peculiar stagnation in industrial production was, of course, partly
related to the bad crops, but increased liberalization and stronger competition
from imported goods most probably played a role as well. Deliberate liberali-
zation measures were taken during these years, partly to stimulate growth,
partly to induce imports as an anti-inflationary measure. Licenses were issued
more generously. In early 1950 the ad valorem duty was reduced from 7 to 3
percent; duties on machinery for new industrial undertakings were reduced
from the 6—10 percent range to 4 percent; and wheat, barley, beans, and
lentils were exempted from all duties. Later in 1951 tariffs on a number of
foodstuffs were abolished altogether, and the ad valorem duty on imports of
machinery and certain foodstuffs was reduced to 1 - percent.9 Revenue duties
on tobacco and alcoholic beverages were, on the other hand, increased sharply,
together with duties on automobiles.
The combination of an inflationary boom and stagnation in industry thus
seems to be explained by two circumstances. First, when a country experiences
a strong improvement in its terms of trade through a rise in export prices,
national income and expenditure are bound to expand more strongly than na-
tional product in real terms. The difference consists, of course, in the terms
of trade gain. Business indicators related to expenditures are therefore also
bound to show stronger expansion than indicators related to production. And
there is nothing to prevent real expenditure from increasing even with failing
production. Second, high cotton prices and the expenditure boom did not lead
to a production boom but, rather, the opposite because, on the one hand,
full capacity in cotton acreage was already reached before the Korean boom
and, on the other, economic policy as expressed in trade liberalization served
to divert domestic demand toward imported goods. But, of course, as we have
pointed out, there were also exogenous factors that affected manufacturing
adversely through the poor agricultural crops.
The international cotton market collapsed at the end of 1951, and, after
a vain attempt by the Egyptian government to keep international prices for
extra long staple cotton at a high level (among other things, by taking over all
futures contracts at the Alexandria Bourse and buying in the spot market for
stockpiling), Egyptian cotton prices fell drastically during 1952.10 Export
revenues shrank, and the trade deficit soared to a peak of £ E65 million that
year. The rapid drop in the exchange reserves generated a fall in money
supply (Table 3—5), and for 1952—53 the government cut expenditure by
about 10 percent. The general situation thus shifted very rapidly from an ex-
penditure boom to a recession.
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With the end of prosperity, Egypt's liberalization policy vanished, too.
It had helped to stabilize prices, but had probably also contributed to the
stagnation in domestic production. It was too short-lived to have had any
importance for long-term growth. (For a discussion of this policy in a more
general setting, see Chapter 3, p. 75.)
POST-KOREAN RECESSION, LICENSING,
AND THE IMPORT ENTITLEMENT SYSTEM:
THE BEGINNING OF PHASE II
In its first years, the economic policy of the revolutionary government, except
for the land reforms, was generally conservative. Both monetary and fiscal
policy were, on balance, deflationary, and production expanded only slowly
until around 1955. Between 1952 and 1955, the budget deficit averaged only
about £E3 million and the money supply remained nearly constant. From
virtual stagnation in 1952—53 the growth rate of GNP rose to about 3½ per-
cent in 1955—56. A major reason for the stagnation was the lack of appre-
ciable growth in agricultural production (slightly above 1 percent annually
on the average from 1952—53 to 1956—57). This slow growth was partly a
result of the depressed prices" and partly a result of the government's area
restriction policies, which from 1953 on aimed at shifting agricultural pro-
duction from cotton to wheat (see Chapter 6 and Appendix A). Cotton ex-
port taxes (temporarily abrogated in 1952) remained high for• some time
despite the depressed international prices. At the same time, industrial growth
was also slow until 1955 (see Table 2—9).
Until 1952 Egypt had a small deficit in its of trade with the
sterling area. However, this was more than offset by a surplus generated on
the invisible accounts (stemming mostly from Britain's military expenditures
in Egypt). This surplus, as well as the gradual release of old sterling balances,
had financed a large deficit vis-à-vis dollar and soft currency countries, initially
through triangular transactions and later through the export pound.
In 1952, following the collapse of cotton prices, sales to the United
Kingdom (Egypt's largest customer) fell' to about a fifth of their average
in the years since the end of the war.12 This would not deserve special mention
if it had been a temporary phenomenon related to the post-Korean recession
in the developed countries, but, in fact, it marked the beginning of the down-
ward trend of cotton exports to Western countries. Long-run factors included
the decline of the Lancashire textile industry, the gradual substitution of syn-
thetic fibers for cotton, and technological innovations that permitted the use
of medium and coarse counts of cotton in the production of fine cloth. De-
mand shifted away from extra long staple—the Egyptian speciality—to long
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TABLE 2—10
Trade with Sterling Area and Nonsterling Countries, 19S1—1957
(mill. LE)
Merchandise
Exports
Merchandise
Imports
Balance on Current
Account
Sterling Sterling Sterling
Year Area Nonsterling Area Nonsterling Area Nonsterling
1951 74.5 127.4 77.2 164.7 27.3 —42.5
1952 27.7 117.9 52.8 157.7 —3.6 —49.8
1953 35.2 100.1 31.4 133.8 27.7 —35.6
1954 36.3 103.5 36.5 114.2 17.2 —13.6
1955 24.3 108.8 40.7 149.5 —4.7 —38.7
1956 19.9 110.0 42.9 149.4 —5.7 —38.7
1957 8.8 157.2 18.1 199.4 - —5.7 —25.5
SOURCES: Annuaire Stat istique and Economic Bulletin, various issues.
and medium staple, which favored Sudanese and American varieties. At the
same time, Sudan emerged as a major producer of long staple cotton and
substantially eroded the Egyptian share of the Western market.
Not surprisingly, therefore, Egypt experienced a deficit in her current
transactions with the sterling area and other countries in 1952 (see Table
2—10). By the end of the year her free sterling reserves were down to a neg-
ligible amount million). The total free reserves including gold
98 million) were still roughly equivalent to five months' imports.'3 The ex-
ternal deficit on current account was reduced considerably in 1953, and in
1954 there was even a slight surplus, actually a sign of domestic slackness
rather than of soundness in the economy. In 1955 and 1956 the deficit became
significant once more as a result of a strong expansion in imports (Table
2—10) of credit-financed capital goods.
In view of the unfavorable balance of payments picture in 1952, the
government felt that it had to take strong corrective measures, but it was
certainly too deflationary in its general policy. Exchange regulations and
controls now became so comprehensive that developments can be identified
with the co-directors' Phase II, which lasted until the nationalization of 1961.
General Import Licensing.
The first step taken by the government to improve the foreign exchange
position was to extend import licensing in 1952 to all countries and to limit
imports from the sterling area to necessities. Further, a 10 percent surcharge
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was imposed on all remittances abroad, and customs duties on tobacco and
luxuries were raised. On the other hand, licenses for imports from countries
with which Egypt had bilateral agreements were Issued without limit. In gen-
eral, imports in hard currency were confined to essentials, while semi-essential
imports, such as textiles, were restricted to the export pound or to barter
agreements.
The Import Entitlement System.
The second step was to introduce a comprehensive import entitlement
system in 1953. Under this arrangement exporters who shipped goods to the
dollar or sterling areas received an import entitlement for 75 percent of the
value of exports (66 percent for goods shipped to West Germany) and for
100 percent in the case of exports of cotton yarn and textiles. The entitlement
was transferable. Exporters could now sell cotton at a discount, recouping any
losses by the premium they obtained through selling their import entitlement
to importers. Import entitlements commanded a premium ranging over the
next several years from 8 to 14 percent for dollars, 5 to 10 percent for sterling,
and 8 to 12 percent for German marks (Table 2—3, columns 3—5). They
could be used to import the commodities on the list for the export account
(essentials and semi-essentials); but they were less restrictive in that they
permitted importation from the sterling and dollar areas. Moreover, in order -
to encourage foreign investment and as an exception to the import entitlement
regulations, all products could be imported from dollar and sterling areas pro-
vided that the proceeds of the sales were invested in Egypt. The value of such
imports could not exceed 65 percent of the total foreign capital to be invested
in Egypt; the remainder had to be invested in dollars or sterling at par.'4
The import entitlement system was far more comprehensive than the ex-
port accounts, and it spread the partial devaluation to a larger segment of
trade. At their peak, export accounts financed only 12 percent of imports,
while the import entitlement system covered 40 percent of imports in the
first year of its operation.15 The supplementation of the export pound by
the import entitlement system thus represented a further depreciation of the
Egyptian currency. Nevertheless, the depreciation as reflected in the import
entitlement quotations throughout 1953 and 1954 remained small; by the end
of 1954, the premiums were 7.13 percent for sterling, and 10 percent for the
U.S. dollar (Table 2—3).
Through the relative rise in import prices in terms of domestic currency
and the discount on exports, the import entitlement system, together with
tighter import control on nonessentials, probably contributed to the marked
improvement in the balance of payments and the resulting small current ac-
count surplus in 1954. However, it applied to only three currencies, which
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created severe imbalances with other currencies. Imports from France, to
which entitlements did not apply, were relatively cheap, while exports to
France were relatively expensive. This contributed to a severe Egyptian deficit
vis-à-vis France which the government tried to reduce by ad hoc measures
(for example, granting cotton a discount of 6.5 percent when exported to
France)
BILATERAL TRADE
With the shortage of transferable sterling as well as hard currencies, bilateral
agreements appeared increasingly attractive to Egypt and its trading partners
in Western and Eastern Europe. Italy, Belgium, West Germany, and the
Netherlands concluded payments and trade agreements with Egypt in the years
1952 and 1953. The proliferation of these agreements was such that, by the
end of 1953, no less than 55 percent of Egypt's foreign turnover was governed
by bilateral agreements, as shown in Table 2—11.
Most of the payments agreements were based on Egyptian pounds (stipu-
lated in those concluded with Eastern European countries) or on various
combinations of the two partners' currencies (stipulated in the agreements
concluded with Western European countries).'7 The exchange rates of the
two currencies were fixed vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, and the agreements guaran-
teed adjustment of the outstanding net balance in the event of a change in the
exchange rate. They specified the manner in which any outstanding balance
might be settled (usually in goods) and fixed a debt ceiling. The agree-
ments allowed for triangular settlements, as Egyptian exchange control "often
TABLE 2-11
Egypt's Balance of Payments with Bilateral
Agreement Countries
(mill. LE)
.
Merchandise
Trade Account
Ocher
Transactions• Total
Deficit
Turnover as %
of Total
Foreign
TransactionsYear Receipts Payments Receipts Payments
1951 42.3 51.0 10.9 26.1 —23.8 21
1952 70.0 73.5 16.0 31.3 —18.8 39
1953 90.8 92.1 27.1 33.3 —7.5 55
Nom: The United Kingdom is excluded. Transactions in any one year cover only
those countries with which there were agreements during that year.
SOURCE: Economic Bulletin, National Bank of Egypt, 1954, p. 166.
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approves on an administrative basis the export of cotton to an agreement
country with payment being received from the account of another agreement
country."8
Transferability of outstanding balances enhances the efficiency of bilateral
trade. Nonetheless, bilateral agreements usually imply an effective deprecia-
tion of one of the two currencies involved vis-à-vis hard currencies. For, with
the addition of bilateral trade, the volume of competitive commodities traded
(i.e., with a c.i.f. price equal to or lower than the world market price at the
official exchange rate) is likely to exceed that which would have been con-
tracted under pure multilateralism. Moreover, its composition is also likely
to include goods for which c.i.f. import prices exceed world market prices at
the official par rate. This expansion in trade volume can only be achieved by
paying relatively more for imports or receiving less for exports (in terms of
world market prices, not domestic prices), which amounts to some degree of
currency depreciation.'9 Such implicit depreciation was brought out explicitly
through the special arrangement with Switzerland commonly referred to as the
In 1950, when the agreement with Switzerland was renewed, it
was decided that certain transactions should be carried in Swiss francs and
others (specified in the form of a list of goods) in Egyptian pounds—the B-
account. Instead of having a fixed exchange rate between the Egyptian pound
and the Swiss franc, the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound in Switzerland
was left to be decided by market conditions. The same arrangement was later
incorporated into the agreements with Belgium and the Netherlands. The
quotations for the Egyptian pound in the three markets are shown in Table
2—3. At the end of 1953 these rates reflected a depreciation of the Egyptian
pound of 3 percent vis-à-vis the, dollar in Amsterdam, 6 percent in Zurich,
and 10 percent in Brussels.
THE ABOLITION OF THE EXPORT POUND
AND IMPORT ENTITLEMENTS, 1955
The multiplicity of rates existing for identical commodities gave rise to lucra-
tive arbitrage transactions. In 1955 Britain insisted, as part of the agreement
on further sterling No. 2 releases, that the entitlement on sterling be dropped
and the Egyptian pound be treated at par with sterling. The agreement was
implemented in September 1955; entitlements on all other currencies were
terminated as well. Earlier in the year export accounts had also been abolished,
having lost all practical importance. Thus Egypt resorted again to a uniform
exchange rate. But instead of devaluing its currency, which would have con-
solidated and generalized the previous partial depreciations, she chose to main-
tain the par value of the currency with the imposition of an import surcharge
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of 7 percent and a premium on cotton exports. The 7 percent surcharge applied
to all imports except industrial equipment needed for investments and raw
materials, which implied the exemption of roughly 50 percent of imports from
the surcharge. The premium on cotton exports took the form of a reduction
in the export tax (for example, from 300 to 160 piasters per kantar on Kar-
nak) which corresponded to an 8 percent reduction in price. But other
exports (in particular, cotton textiles, agricultural products, and leather goods)
no longer benefited from any kind of premiums.
However, this was not sufficient to permit relaxation of exchange control
measures; in fact, in view of the reappearance of a large balance of payments
deficit in 1955, import controls were tightened. A new import policy was an-
nounced in March 1956 whereby licenses were issued on a half-yearly basis,
with the aggregate value of licenses issued for each half-year period corre-
sponding to 50 percent of the preceding year's export earnings. This was the
first systematic attempt to establish a foreign exchange budget with import
quotas determined in relation to exports. Old importers (somewhat incon-
sistently) were granted licenses up to 50 percent of their average imports
during the last two years, while new importers were considered on the basis
of the price of their imports and the type of currency involved.20 The degree
of restriction differed according to the priority given to various commodities
(automobile and other consumer durables imports were prohibited altogether),
and the 7 percent import surcharge had to be paid at the time of the, issuance
of the license. Later in the year an attempt was made to link import authoriza-
tion to export performance by granting import licenses to any firm which
succeeded in expanding its exports. A firm could import its own inputs up to
50 percent of the value of exports.
In the fall of 1956 the British-French-Israeli attack on the Suez Canal
upset all these arrangements and we shall never know how they would have
worked.
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AFTER 1956 AND
THE SHIFT TOWARD EAST BLOC TRADE
The conservative caution of the government in regard to monetary and fiscal
policy continued until 1959. Money supply, which had increased substantially
during the Suez War, was only slightly higher at the end of 1958 than at the
end of 1956, and government net borrowing from the banking system was
modest until 1960—61 (see Table 3—5). Significant external current account
deficits of about £E20 to 30 million were experienced each year from 1957
to 1960, partly caused by bank-financed capital goods imports for development
purposes and weapons purchases. The remainder of the blocked sterling re-
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serves was finally released, however, and some aid was obtained from both
West and East. At the end of 1959, with all sterling reserves released, Egypt
still had a gross exchange reserve corresponding to seven months' imports
plus government payments abroad (including payments for military equip-
ment) and a net reserve corresponding to about 3 months' imports plus
government payments abroad.
The events surrounding the Suez War of 1956 severely disrupted the
flow of trade and shifted its geographic distribution toward Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union (see Table 1—6). In the immediate aftermath of the
Suez War, Egypt again concluded a number of barter agreements with Western
countries in which highly inflated import prices reflected substantial discounts
on sales of Egyptian cotton. At the same time, large purchases of cotton by
the USSR and Czechoslovakia were re-exported to the West at discounts
reaching 28 percent.2' As a result, Western markets refrained from buying
Egyptian cotton directly even when equivalent discounts were granted. Sub-
sequently, the communist countries were to readjust their cotton policies to
allow for much larger consumption of Egyptian cotton.
Nevertheless, Egyptian imports continued to reflect heavy reliance on
Western sources. The deficit on current transactions was mainly with Western
countries, and the need for an expansion of exports to the West was strongly
felt. The payments situation in 1954 and 1957 is shown in Table 2—12.
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE BUDGET
At the beginning of 1957 Egypt adopted a number of measures intended to
encourage exports to the West and to restrict further the imports of non-
essentials. A foreign exchange budget was set up, and a quarterly quota was
established for imports on the basis of past export performance. The exchange
budget first determined the import requirements of the Ministry of Supply
(wheat, tea and coffee, et cetera), and then allocated a monthly quota for the
importation of pharmaceuticals. Thereafter, it allocated to raw materials im-
ports by industrial producers a global quota equal to one-fourth of the quantity
imported in the previous year.22 Finally, it allowed for seasonal imports,
which were deducted from subsequent quotas.
EXPORT PREMIUM SYSTEMS AND IMPORT
DUTIES, 1957—1961
As part of the policy outlined above, the government also announced a
system of export premiums, which varied by currency and destination and
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TABLE 2—12
Distribution of Current Payments and Receipts
by Country Group, 1954 and 1957
1954 1957
(mill. LE) (% ) (mill. LE) (% )
Current receipts
from:
Eastern Europe 21.6 10 85.2 37
West 169.3 76 95.7 40
Other countries 31.3 14 56.3 23
Total 222.2 100 237.2 100
Current payments
to: -
Eastern Europe 18.3 8 84.4 31
West 174.4 80 119.2 44
Other countries 25.9 12 64.8 25
Total 218.6 100 268.4 100
Balance
on current account:
Eastern Europe 3.3 0.8
West —5.1 —23.5
Other countries 5.4 —8.5
Total 3.6 —31.2
NOTE: "Eastern Europe" includes Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, the USSR,
and Yugoslavia. "West" includes American monetary area, sterling area,
and European countries not included in Eastern Europe.
SOURCE: D. Mead, op. cit., Table V—A—IO.
were adjusted periodically in response to cotton prices and the general trends
in the current balance of payments. From February to May 1957, the premium
was applied only to cotton; it amounted to 10 percent on exports against
Indian rupees and Italian liras, 15 percent on exports to Germany in DMs,
15 percent on exports against dollars to countries other than the United
States and Canada, and 20 percent on exports against dollars to the United
States and Canada. In May 1957, the premiums were extended to exports of
onions (20 percent) against convertible currencies, and those on cotton were
raised across the board by 5 percentage points.
An import fee of 10 percent was imposed in February 1957 on all imports
against convertible currencies. The 7 percent surcharge that had been intro-
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duced in 1955 was extended to all nonessentials and later increased to 9 per-
cent. In June the fees on government purchases with the currencies mentioned
above were doubled to 20 percent.
The premium system was the third example of partial, de facto deprecia-
tion introduced in the postwar period. It was accompanied by a rise in whole-
sale prices (8 percent between August 1956 and August 1957), which was
concentrated on import goods such as tea, coffee, fuel, and paper. Imports
of textiles and consumer durables (automobiles, for example) fell during
1957, as did imports of intermediate products (paper, wood, jute
For the first time in the postwar period "a general scarcity of imported goods
and raw materials" was reported.24 Part of this phenomenon was certainly
due to the disruption of trade caused by the Suez War, but it also marked
the beginning of a recurrent pattern of commodity shortages in the Egyptian
economy. It should be mentioned that the period 1955—1957 saw the launch-
ing of several large industrial plants (such as the iron and steel plant at
Heiwan, and fertilizer and tire plants), entailing heavy imports of capital
equipment. At this time most Western European countries returned to con-
vertibility, thereby increasing the number of currencies sold at a premium
and reducing the opportunities for bilateral agreements, which Egypt now
relied upon heavily.
In 1958, the premium on exports was extended to all commodities ex-
cept rice and oil products through the reintroduction of nonresident "export
accounts," which were freely transferable to other nonresidents. However,
while in the old system (1950—1956) the premiums had been left to the
market, in the new system the premiums were fixed by the 'central bank.
The premium developed as follows:
(percent)
March 1 to March 10, 1958 30.0
March 10 to June 6, 1958 26.5
June 7 to September 1, 1958 25.0
September 2, 1958 to April 20, 1959 17.6
Starting with April 1959, the premium on cotton was changed frequently,
sometimes from week to week. It was adjusted according to the international
supply and demand situation in an attempt to assure the competitiveness of
cotton abroad at relatively stable producer prices. When the cotton season
of 1958—59 was near its end and unusually large supplies were still avail-
able, the premium averaged around 53 percent (between May and July of
1959). The new season (1959—60) started with premiums around 23 per-
cent; they were frequently adjusted downward as supplies became gradually
smaller toward the spring of 1960. At that time the premium averaged 6
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percent and the carryover was about half that of the previous season. When
the availability of two crops overlapped, a higher premium was quoted for
the old crop than for the new one. It should be added that during the cotton
seasons 1958—59 and 1959—60 the cotton export taxes were lowered and
subsequently abolished for almost all varieties and grades; by itself the lower-
ing of export taxes implied a depreciation.25 Thus, the policy shifted from
taxing to subsidizing cotton cultivation for a few years until 1962.
By the middle of 1959, exports of cotton received a premium fluctuating
around 25 percent, onions and textiles, a premium of 29 percent, and other
exports with the exception of rice and oil products, a premium of 17.5 per-
cent. On the import side, fluctuating premiums prevailed through 1958 at
rates between 30 and 17 percent, with a higher premium applied to govern-
ment purchases. At the same time all imports were paying the 9 percent
surcharge. Note that trade with Eastern European countries was subject
to no premiums, either on imports or on exports: export prices higher than
world market prices were offset by higher import prices.26
In September 1959 the "export account" system was abolished and re-
placed by a system in which premiums on the Egyptian pound were applied
to receipts and payments in convertible currencies. All current transactions
were grouped into categories, as follows :27
1. Imports of goods and invisibles were to pay a premium of 27.5 per-
cent, except for certain capital goods and raw materials.
2. Exports of manufactured products, except textiles and cement, were
to receive a premium of 17.5 percent.
3. Exports of cotton, textiles, and onions were to receive a variable
premium which would be adjusted periodically according to international
market prices (each week in the case of cotton). It averaged between 25
and 30 percent in December 1959.
4. Exports of rice and cement, which were sold at the official exchange
rate, occasionally carried an export tax.
As the balance of payments situation improved again, the premium
on most exports was reduced, first to 20 percent in January 1960 and then to
10 percent in July. At the same time, the "statistical" ad valorem tax of 1
percent on all imports was raised to 5 percent. Moreover, the 9 percent import
surcharge was extended to imports from countries with which Egypt had bi-
lateral agreements. Half the premium was, however, refunded in the case of
imports of foodstuffs, raw materials, and industrial equipment; such imports
exceeded two-thirds of total imports. Thus, by adding the import surcharge
of 9 percent, the premium (½ of 10 percent), and the statistical tax (5 per-
cent), we reach an effective premium (not including tariffs) of 19 percent
on imports of food, raw materials, and industrial equipment, as compared
with an effective premium of 10 percent on all exports.
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THE NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN
TRADE, 1961
In July 1961 the government nationalized a large number of companies. A
virtual government monopoly was established for imports: the right to import
was restricted to state-owned import companies, with some state-owned in-
dustrial companies authorized to import directly the commodities and equip-
ment needed for their own use.
With respect to exports, the government acquired majority participation
in all export trade companies that dealt principally in cotton. The cotton
futures market was abolished and the Alexandria bourse was closed. The
Egyptian Cotton Commission (ECC) was given a monopoly in internal trade
and became the sole supplier to the export companies.28 Instead of the
earlier policy of giving exchange premiums to private exporters, who could
then sell cotton at a discount, the ECC now simply fixed export prices peri-
odically in line with world prices. These fell below domestic buying prices,
as on previous occasions. On the other hand, the ECC sold cotton to domestic
mills at prices 11 percent higher than its own purchase prices from agri-
culture.2° This price differential, which was reflected in a rise in textile prices,
helped check domestic consumption and increased exportable supplies; it
reversed the earlier policy of sales to domestic mills at prices below world
market prices (at a margin equal to the export taxes abolished during the
years 1958—1960). With respect to cotton textile exports, the price differ-
ential was made up by a premium until 1962 and by a subsidy later. While
cotton export prices were constantly adjusted in response to the supply and
demand situation abroad, domestic buying and selling prices were adjusted
occasionally only in response to cost movements or to adjust the profit-
ability of alternative crops.
Trade in rice was also monopolized by the government, but a number
of small private export companies dealing in fruits and vegetables remained
in business.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE CRISIS
AND DEVALUATION, 1962
During 1961 and 1962 the balance of payments suffered several setbacks.
In 1961 the cotton crop experienced a major failure; production was down
by 40 percent despite a record sown acreage. This crop failure was reflected in
the export figures for both 1961 and 1962. Moreover, a decrease in the rice
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crop, together with a rise in domestic rice consumption, in 1962 cut exports
of that commodity to almost half of the level they had reached in previous
years. Imports of food, particularly of cereals, increased drastically in 1961
and even more so in 1962; but this increase was financed by PL 480 counter-
part funds and thus did not strain exchange reserves. Egypt was, however,
committed to certain extraordinary capital expenditures, such as compensa-
tions to the old Suez Canal stockholders, to the Sudanese Government on
account of the Aswan High Dam construction, and to the United Kingdom
for "Egyptianized" property.
All these circumstances pointed toward an acute foreign exchange crisis
in 1962. The unification of the premiums on imports and exports to 20 percent
at the end of 1961 and the reintroduction of a simple multiple-exchange system
with three rates3° later finally led to devaluation in May 1962.
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